The shape of future Ukrainian, European and global security hangs in the balance. As the war in Ukraine reaches the two year mark, a deadlock has taken hold on the battlefield.
Despite notable success in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions during late 2022, the much-vaunted Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2023 encountered stronger and much more disciplined Russian resistance, partly leading to the current impasse.
Uncertainty remains as to the level of support Kyiv’s key Western backers can provide, particularly in the heat of an election-heavy year. With the Russian economy now on a war footing, the war’s outcome is unknown and hard to determine.
Chatham House experts have identified four possible scenarios to ending the war, and their likely consequences. During this session the panel will discuss the following scenarios:
- Scenario 1, “Russia wins”: American support is drawn down or cut off in early 2025. Ukraine struggles to defend itself, let alone push the Russians back. Russia claims victory. Zelenskyy and his government fall.
- Scenario 2, “Ukraine wins”: Ukraine has pushed Russia back from all of its internationally recognized territory. The war is over.
- Scenario 3, “Deal”: Forced by either the international community or by circumstance, Russia and Ukraine sign a ceasefire and/or a peace deal.
- Scenario 4, “No Deal”: Russia and Ukraine keep on fighting with the same goals. Neither manages a decisive blow but neither shows any interest in a deal.
Ending the War in Ukraine: Harder Than It Seems
The Russo-Ukrainian War risks following the usual pattern of other interstate conflicts since 1946: absent the end of fighting during the first year, conventional wars last over a decade on average. The most likely endings are a frozen conflict or cease-fire potentially sooner than a decade, and perhaps, over time, a negotiated armistice. Peace treaties have become rare for all interstate wars since 1950. The worst case would be if the Russo-Ukrainian conflict turns into a dress rehearsal for a broader East-West war involving the U.S. and China. Although that outcome is currently far less likely than a frozen conflict or cease-fire, it cannot be ruled out in a world where the major powers are increasingly divided. Total victory or defeat for either Ukraine (or Russia) cannot be dismissed as possibilities but they appear increasingly unlikely. Although there are growing worries about a Russian “breakthrough” in view of last year’s unsuccessful Ukrainian counteroffensive, Ukrainian perseverance remains strong, and the specter of total defeat would most likely energize additional European and U.S. military support to prevent not only a Ukrainian collapse but also far-reaching damage to Western prestige. More likely are the scenarios below, which deal with situations in between the extreme endings of victory or defeat and focus on how a middle-ground outcome in the Russo-Ukrainian War could occur.
Frozen Conflict but No Negotiated Cease-Fire
The “Kremlin has long used frozen conflicts to extend their reach beyond Russian borders,” according to researcher Erik J. Grossman at the U.S. National War College. In Moldova, for example, Russia “has backed the pro-Russian regime in the breakaway region of Transdniestria since 1992. In 2008, Georgia faced a conventional Russian invasion in support of the separatist governments in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.” More recently, Moscow invaded Crimea in February 2014 and started backing pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas, the backdrop to the current war. As in the Moldovan and Georgian cases, a frozen conflict occurred after most of the fighting ceased, and there may come to be a de facto cease-fire in and talks in Ukraine, but no agreement. According to Grossman, such frozen conflicts serve the Kremlin’s purpose of countering “the growth of Western alliances in the region.” In other words, frozen conflicts are a solution to the problem of creeping European Union (EU) and NATO influence in the post-Soviet space, which Moscow is otherwise unable to thwart.
Grossman’s article was written before the 2022 outbreak of the Ukraine War, but even when the article was published in 2018, it was clear that Russia was having difficulty turning the Donbas into a frozen conflict because Moscow was facing Western military and political support for Ukraine. In the other cases, Russia acted more openly and mostly without Western interference.
In this scenario, a frozen conflict comes about after Western arms shipments diminish, undermining Ukraine’s offensive capabilities. Former President Donald Trump has encouraged congressional allies to vote against aid to Ukraine, and has been critical of weapons transfers.. A second Biden administration would continue to militarily support Ukraine but might face more Republican opposition and be unable to pass needed legislation. Ukraine would most likely try to continue fighting with the Europeans ramping up Kyiv’s supplies of weapons. But unless Ukraine makes gains, European governments, bereft of U.S. backing, will probably face pressures to negotiate with Moscow. Trump or other allied leaders might try to make a deal with Putin, but Moscow’s conditions are likely to be too stringent. The Ukrainian government and people may also be opposed to settling the conflict and effectively ceding a fifth of their territory to Russia. With Moscow’s war economy keeping his popularity high, Russian President Vladimir Putin may see some advantages with a frozen conflict so long as it keeps a rump and weakened Ukraine out of NATO. See More
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